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ABSTRACT
Beginning with intense competition for the first A-7 , the
Navy by necessity entered sole source negotiations for later
procurements of the A-7. The operational need of these A-7's
drove the Navy to letter contracts while increasing sophis-
ticiation of the avionics and changing military requirements
complicated the definitization of these contracts.
To better understand these problems and the Navy business
clearance process, a history of the Navy Procurement Control
and Clearance Division is presented in Section II. Sections
I and III present A-7 contracts in case study format for the
A-7A, A-7B, A-7D, and A-7E. Section IV is a case study of
the A-7F VAST contract.
The procurement of a military aircraft is a complex
process. The Project Manager and the contracting officer
must constantly strive to make the technology advances and
requirement change's compatible with sound business practices.
The study of the A-7 contracts illustrates many of the inevi-
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I. INTRODUCTION
The procurement of modern military aircraft is a complex
process. Aircraft are produced to counter a present or future
threat; but more than any other weapons system, an aircraft
concept often begins as a result of some technological break-
through. This heavy reliance on state-of-the-art advances
has caused aircraft procurement to be replete with technical
problems that are difficult and costly to solve. No less
difficult and costly are the business problems inherent in an
aircraft procurement. Although initial competition is the
rule of these programs, because of the magnitude and complex-
ity of the problem involved in producing a specific aircraft
design, the second production contract has always been sole
source. What may begin with 161 aircraft, $196.0 million
and a four year contract often evolves to encompass 1336
aircraft, $4.0 billion and a fifteen year contract.
The focal point of these problems is the project office.
With a myriad of people looking over the project's shoulder,
the office attempts to bring the specified aircraft to pro-
duction on time and within cost. This requires satisfying
those persons who always want the aircraft sooner and with
better performance specifications. On the other hand, the
project office must satisfy the statutory and procedural
requirements of higher authority (including Congress) who
may have concerns other than performance and schedule. These
sources pay particular attention to the concept of a fair

and reasonable price and the effective utilization of budget
dollars. The Project Manager and the Contracting Officer
must resolve these inherent conflicts in the procurement




II. A- 7A HISTORY
A. CONCEPT
The need for an airframe that could accept a new jet
engine was the action that initiated the A-7 concept. Though
the military contracts separately for engines and aircraft
to control each important element, it is most often a new
airframe concept that dictates the development of a new
engine. Occasionally an engine is improved and then incor-
proated into an existing airframe. In this case, however, a
completely new type of jet engine was being developed under
a Navy contract with the Pratt and Whitney Division of United
Aircraft. This turbofan jet engine, later designated the
TF-30, offered much greater thrust for the same fuel consump-
tion of a conventional jet engine. Thus any aircraft with
this engine could stay airborne longer, go farther and carry
more weight than previously possible. Speed was not a major
factor since airframe design limited the maximum speed
possible. The important factors, then, were those of an
attack aircraft: loiter time over target, range, and
ordnance load. In 1960, a Bureau of Naval Weapons (BUWFPS)
study group included as one of its recommendations the
development of a new Navy attack aircraft to take advantage
of this turbofan jet engine's capabilities. Discussions
continued for two years on the proposed VAL aircraft (Visual
Attack, Light) until November 19 62, when the Chief of Naval
Operations asked BUWEPS for its VAL recommendations.

Since the TF-30 would complete development during 1963-
1964, BUWEPS considered time the most important constraint.
In its view, both time to contract and time to produce an
operational aircraft could be considerably shortened by
using an A-4 series aircraft. The A-4 was a current Navy
attack aircraft then ordered into its fifth production
version. This A-4D-6, an A-4 modified to accept the TF-30
engine, would only require changes to an already manned and
operating production line. Thus a contract with Douglas
Aircraft Corporation, producer of the A-4, would give the
Fleet the new Visual Light Attack aircraft in the shortest
amount of time.
Two considerations overruled this A-4 recommendation and
both of them concerned the lack of competition. First, since
the basic procurement statute required consideration of
competition, it would be politically difficult to make the
time element sufficiently firm or urgent enough to eliminate
all other aircraft manufacturers but the Douglas Aircraft
Corporation. This would almost certainly be manifested
during Congressional Appropriations hearings and could
possibly negate any time savings available from sole source
contract procurement. Second, it would be economically
difficult to negotiate a sole source contract of this
magnitude.
To solve these and other related problems, the Sea Based
Air Strike study group was formed in December 1962. In early
1963, the group briefed a meeting of eight aircraft contractors

as to the purpose of their study and solicited the help of
the entire aircraft industry. The contractors represented
were: Boeing, North American Aviation, McDonnell Aircraft
Corporation, Lockheed, Douglas Aircraft Corporation, Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Corporation, General Dynamics, Chance
Vought (recently acquired by Ling-Temco-Vought)
.
Through April 1963, the contractors and their representa-
tives continued to meet with the study group. These informal
discussions centered on the specifications for the VAL program
and the method for most rapidly obtaining these specifications
On 17 May 1963, Specific Operational Requirement Wll-26 was
issued by the Chief of Naval Operations which formally stated
the need for a new Visual Light Attack aircraft:
The results of an exhaustive operational and cost-
effectiveness analysis demonstrates conclusively that
immediate action is required to update our current light
attack aircraft inventory with the [new] turbofan jet
engine
.
Just one week later the Sea Based Air Strike study group
issued its findings. The conclusions from contractor discus-
sions and service recommendations were set down in three
basic points.
1) The VAL should be a single-seat and single-engine
light attack aircraft.
2) To speed utilization of the TF-30 turbofan jet engine,
the VAL should be constructed from a redesign of a then
current military aircraft.
3) The most competitive designs for modification were
the FJ-5 of North American Aviation, the A4D of Douglas





Procurement by formal advertising was considered imprac-
tical since only three aircraft manufacturers were being
actively solicited and each was working on a different
proposal (modification of his own aircraft to accept the
TF-30) . On the other extreme, sole source negotiation had
been avoided by the unique concept of competing the modifi-
cation proposals between three fleet aircraft, only one of
which was originally designed for the attack mission. The
choice of procurement method narrowed to either competitive
negotiation or a newly devised technique called two-step
formal advertising.
Two-step formal advertising would have required the three
contractors to submit their modification proposals without
price data in the first step. The Navy could have then
rejected or accepted the proposals or required further data
to make the proposals acceptable. When any or all of the
proposals were technically acceptable for the TF-30 attack
mission, step two would be initiated. In step two the contrac-
tors with acceptable technical proposals would bid a price
for their individual aircraft modification plan. On the
basis of price alone, the Navy would award the contract. In
rejecting this approach, the Navy stated that the two-step
formal advertising procedure would not permit trade-offs of
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desired performance in exchange for price. Competitive
negotiation was chosen as the procurement method.
Competitive negotiation requires the execution of certain
legal and administrative documents derived from statute or
departmental regulations. The central regulation for
military procurement, the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tions (ASPR) , requires that one of the seventeen negotiation
exceptions under Title 10, United States Code 2304(a) be
listed and supported as the reason for not using formal
advertising. A Determinatiions and Findings (DSF) is a legal
document that lists the specific exception to formal adver-
tising and supports the decision to negotiate that procure-
ment. This document is signed by either the contracting
officer or the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations
and Logistics, (ASN,I&L) depending on the exception. When
the ASN(ISL) signs the D&F, it is accompanied by a Request
for Authority to Negotiate (RAN) which contains further sub-
stantiating reasons for negotiating that procurement. The
RAN aids the Secretary in reaching a decision and may also
contain proposed contracting methods, contract type, and
time schedule for negotiation, award and deliveries.
The D&F (citing Exception #11, Research and Development)
for the VAL development program was signed by the ASN(ISL)
in August 1963. The accompanying Request for Authority to
Negotiate stressed one component of the proposed contract.
Under item #4, it stated, "A firm fixed-price contract will
be negotiated for the total development, fabrication and
11

production of the Visual Attack, Light, aircraft." Under
item #9, it stated "the winning contractor will be selected
on the overall cost of the entire program and not just the
cost of modification." The contract was priced in two parts.
The cost for each contractor to modify his aircraft to the
TF-30 engine within other contract parameters was considered
first. Then each contractor proposed prices for varying
production quantities of his aircraft. The split was neces-
sary because only research and development funds were to be
used for the modification phase.
The contract was divided into four lots. The first two
lots contained the research and development aircraft; the
second two lots were production aircraft. The initial VAL
contract covered only the Lot I buy of three research and
development aircraft plus all nonrecurring modification costs
After that, the options for the other three lots could be
exercised by the Navy on specified dates. Lot II contained
four aircraft for a total of seven research and development
aircraft. Lots III and IV contained variable numbers of
production aircraft so that the Navy could exercise these
options without being forced into an all or nothing choice.
For example, Lot III could be exercised for 15 to 35 aircraft
and Lot IV from 120 to 160 aircraft. The target quantities
were 20 aircraft for Lot III and 140 for Lot IV.
The VAL program was expected to last through 1970. The
present competition concerned the 1964 contract with options
through 1966. For planning purposes only, BUWFPS made
12

Years 1964 1965 1966
R&D 3 4 -
Prod. 20 140
available to the competitors the proposed yearly contracts
through 1970.
First Procurement Other Proposed Contracts
1967 1968 1969 1970
240 240 180 132
With contract award, Lot I was firm fixed price. The
other lots had unit price ceilings set at contract award,
Lot II for the R&D aircraft, Lots III and IV for each variable
production quantity. These price ceilings were subject to
redetermination, downward only, at the later option dates. A
clause from the contract stated:
Respective unit prices constitute a maximum firm fixed
price subject to redetermination downward based on actual
trend of experience available at date of negotiation of
option price.
In addition there was a separate redetermination clause
for certain contract parameters. The clause contained
monetary penalties for failure to meet certain performance
specifications and delivery dates. At the end of negotia-
tions, this clause was expanded to cover the high risk areas
in the winning contract proposal.
C. CONTRACT COMPETITION
On 12 August 1963, North American, Douglas, and LTV were
required to submit their engineering proposals. Of the
other contractors, debriefed by the Sea Based Air Strike
13

study group in May, only Grumman had chosen to continue in
the VAL program. While they were allowed to compete, their
choice of a single-seat but twin-engine modification went
against the Navy's guidance and added the extra cost of
another engine. Thus they were eliminated from the competi-
tion in final phases of negotiation.
With submission of price proposals in early September
1963, the negotiations began in earnest with the three pro-
spective contractors. As the negotiations progressed, BUWFPS
began considering the requirement for a business clearance.
Since this contract was larger than the BUWEPS internal
clearance threshold of $5.0 million, it required a formal
business clearance to be submitted for review and approval
to the Contract Clearance Branch in the Office of Naval
Material
.
On 22 November 1963, the Chief of BUWEPS sent a letter to
the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) setting forth five reasons
for exempting the A-7 (the Navy designation for VAL) contract
from a formal business review. These were:
1. The negotiations are highly competitive and the firm
fixed price contract will give the Government a fair and
reasonable price.
2. BUWEPS does not intend a detailed analysis of the
cost proposals due to the "keen price competition."
The business clearance is a requirement of higher auth-
ority in the Navy with applicable policies and procedures
spelled out in the Navy Procurement Directives . It is designed
to be a review of a proposed contract from a business stand-
point to insure the Navy gets a fair and reasonable price.
14

3. The Government must allow the winning contractor to
begin work as soon as possible to meet milestones in the
contract and guarantee delivery of the A- 7 to the fleet.
4. As stated in the Armed Services Procurement Regula-
tions, the Navy has the duty to promptly notify those bidders
whose proposals are no longer being considered.
5. Most important, BUWFPS needs extra time after the
winner is announced to negotiate special redetermination
clauses peculiar to the winning contractor.
The CNM approved the request of BUWFPS within two weeks
on the condition that BUWEPS submit a summary business
clearance concerning the initial A-7 contract (Lot I) . It
was evident from this action that the CNM was aware of the
important time element in this procurement. He did not, how-
ever, surrender business control of this contract. Lot I
accounted for less than 20% of the total contract value. The
options for the other lots were above the internal BUWEPS
clearance threshold, and the later options had redeterminable
ceiling prices which required negotiations. In other words,
the CNM still had formal review authority over more than 80%
of the total dollars of the A-7A program.
Competitive negotiations continued on the A-7 program










LTV had placed slightly ahead of the other two contractors
in Technical aspects. North American had the best Cost-
effectiveness ratio in a few scenarios, but LTV was the
best overall in Cost-effectiveness. In total program price,
North American had the lowest modification cost ($36.3
million to LTV ' s $51.4 million) but for the total program
LTV was $79 million lower than North American ($196 million
compared to $275 million)
.
The competition for this contract was intensive as each
contractor had the production capacity to absorb this program
In this respect LTV probably had an advantage as its commer-
cial business backlog in 1964 was only $22,000. Its Govern-
ment business was summed up by one Navy negotiator who com-
mented that when the last F-8 fighter rolled off the line
in 1963, he watched the LTV janitor go around and turn off
the lights in the factory.
D. CONTRACT PERFORMANCE
On 19 March 1964, BUWEPS contract Now 64-363f was awarded
to LTV for the A-7A program. This contract for Lot I was
valued at $48 million, but due to a shortage of Navy research
and development funds LTV had agreed to allocate $23.7
million of the non-recurring costs over Lot II and Lot III.
The contract chronology was accepted by LTV as the Navy had
proposed in the planning stage.
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Lot # Type-A/C Option Date Delivery
Lot I R&D=3 19 March 64 Oct-Dec 65
Lot II R&D=4 31 Oct 64 Jan 66
Lot III Prod=15-35 31 Oct 64 Jan 66-Jan 67
Lot IV Prod=120-160 31 Oct 65 Feb 67-Dec 67
In early August 1964, a combined pre-negotiation
clearance for both Lots II and III was submitted to the
Contract Clearance Branch in the Office of Naval Material.
The negotiator proposed using the ceiling prices as a nego-
tiation goal for the Navy. The ceiling prices could only
be negotiated downward with actual data. The scarce prelim-
inary data that was available supported LTV ' s original
predictions or showed that LTV had underestimated some tasks.
In either case, the Navy did not have data that would justify
lowering the ceiling prices of the 4 aircraft in Lot II or
the 35 (maximum number had been ordered) aircraft in Lot III.
As the final step in justifying his pre-negotiation posi-
tion, the negotiator performed a profit analysis for Lots II
and III. With the ceiling prices, each of the participants
to the negotiations computed his profit predictions for LTV
on Lots II and III combined. The auditor predicted 6.9%
profit, the negotiator 3.5%, while LTV predicted only 1.1%
profit. Even if the high prediction of the auditor was
correct, the negotiator demonstrated that this was approxi-
mately one-half the profit expected in sole-source negotiation
for this type of contract. Using the weighted guidelines as
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a check, the negotiator calculated that the Navy's profit
objective should have been 13.7% for Lot II and 14.3% for
Lot III.
The Contract Clearance Branch agreed to using the ceiling
prices as the negotiation goals for exercising the options
on Lots II and III. These options were exercised by the Navy
on 3 September 1964, (two months prior to the option dead
line) for the combined ceiling price of $76,577,170.
The negotiations for Lots II and III, while lacking any
real price negotiations, did surface two other problem areas.
The first problem concerned the new overhead accounts pro-
posed by LTV in the coming sole source negotiations between
the Navy and LTV. The discussion concerned the necessity
of placing an "Asset Revaluation" clause in future contracts
with LTV. The options covered under the contract were, of
course, not affected. The purchase of spares, special support
equipment, or any changes were affected, however, as these
items had not been priced in the contract. This "Asset
Revaluation" covered LTV ' s claim that Chance-Vought ' s assets
had been undervalued at the time of purchase in August 1961.
LTV had revalued the assets upward thus allowing larger
depreciation expenses which in turn caused higher overhead
accounts. The LTV claim was necessary due to the Government
auditor's disallowance of the revalued assets. The auditor
stated that the Government had done extensive business with
Chance-Vought and had already paid for the depreciation of
these assets, and LTV's claim, in effect, made the Government

pay twice for the same equipment. Before this problem was
settled by a court decision against LTV, it affected 320
contract documents and required more than 5000 manhours by
the Navy to handle the clauses and computations in negotia-
tions and to coordinate actions with DCAA.
The second problem concerned the delay in data collection
The Contracts Clearance Branch noted that the downward
redetermination of ceiling prices on each lot was available
only at each lot's option date. Lot IV was the largest buy
and it was imperative that actual data be available for this
negotiation. The problem now manifested itself in the con-
tract chronology. The option date for Lot IV was 31 October
1965, but delivery of Lot III started in January 1966 and
would continue to January 1967. The Contract Clearance
Branch requested a complete subaggregation of data on the
first ten to fifteen aircraft in Lot III. The negotiator
noted this was outside the scope of the contract but he did
advance the possibility during negotiations of LTV aggregat-
ing actual labor hours prior to Lot IV negotiations.
The worry about early data collection disappeared with
the first LTV initiated change. In the fabrication and
structural testing of parts on the first research and
development aircraft, LTV was forced to more the wing four
inches aft on the fuselage. This change from the initial
paper design impacted the autopilot system, the fuel cells,
and many other subsystems. This was not a Navy-initiated
change and LTV had to absorb the cost increase of the wing
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move. Any data supplied after this major change was sure to
justify the use of ceiling prices. In a note to the Contract
Clearance Branch, the negotiator emphasized that preliminary
pricing data then available supported a price $4.5 million
above the ceiling prices for Lots II and III and it did not
seem necessary to collect data early for Lot IV negotiations.
The Navy-initiated changes began before Lot IV was
ordered. The negotiator submitted the pre-negotiation
clearance in July 1965 to buy 140 aircraft at the ceiling
price of $90,709,979. The negotiator noted this was
$508,710 above the oriainal ceiling price due to the incor-
poration of three E.C.P.'s (Engineering Change Proposals).
The actual cost was even higher but Navy deletion of certain
electronic components from the A-7A design provided an off-
setting reduction. The ceiling price was the pre-negotiation
objective because the data that was available supported a
price that was $4.1 million higher than the ceiling price
of Lot IV.
The Contract Clearance Branch agreed to the ceiling price
as the negotiation objective but questioned the purchase of
only 140 aircraft. It urged the purchase of the maximum
number of aircraft available in this lot, 160, to obtain the
greatest savings. Funds, however, were not available to
complete negotiations for all 160 aircraft by the required
option date of 30 October 1965. Negotiating outside of
the specific contract coverage, BUWEPS and LTV agreed on a
compromise. The growing military involvement in Southeast
20

Asia was causing a rising backlog of work among LTV *
s
subcontractors. The Navy immediately advanced LTV $682,701
long lead-time funding for Lot IV on 1 September 1965, to
allow the obligation of critical subcontracts. In return for
this action, LTV granted an indefinite extension of the
October option date. The Navy was only required to provide
long lead-time funding for as many of the remaining 20
aircraft as desired when the Lot IV option was exercised for
the original request of 140 aircraft.
On 26 October 1965, the Navy purchased 140 A-7A for the
ceiling price. It was also decided to provide long lead-time
funding for 17 of the remaining 20 aircraft of Lot IV.
Finally on 10 March 1966, the funding was available and the
last 17 A-7A of NOw 64-363f were ordered for the ceiling
price of $8,600,003.
Though E.C.P.'s began accumulating during the negotiations
on Lot IV, with the $1.5 million RAID radar incorporated as
early as October 1964, October 26, 1965 was the beginning
of the major Navy-initiated changes in the A-7A program. A
meeting was held on this date to discuss the request of the
Chief of Naval Operations and the Department of Defense to
accelerate deliveries of the A-7A. The strategic plans con-
templated more than a squadron of A-7A delivered six months
earlier than scheduled in 1967. It was clear this action
could not be taken unilaterally under the fixed price contract
Initial discussions with LTV indicated a tentative price of
$4.5 million to accelerate 17 A-7A prior to June 1967. In
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early November the basic A-7A contract was amended by $3.0
million to cover the movement of 17 aircraft into the delivery
schedule prior to June 1967 from the 1967 fall deliveries.
There were two other major Navy-initiated changes. First,
during the test program in April 1966, the Navy encountered
an engine flame-out during a simulated catapult launch- This
"steam ingestion" program change was completed by December
1967 and negotiated on a price basis during October 1968,
for $1,232,861. Second, with the A-7A deployed in Southeast
Asia, a group of 37 combat changes was assembled as the
"fleet deployment modification" program. From January 1968
to April 1969, the A-7A (and the A-7B from the follow-on
contract) were modified at sea. In July 1969, the price of
this program was negotiated at $39.6 million of which
$3,373,108 was charged against the A-7A contract.
There was one other major Navy-initiated change, but it
did not add to the cost of the contract. This was the
enforcement of one of the redetermination clauses. During
contract competition the redetermination clauses were formal-
ized into three specific areas and the maximum penalties
were set.
Performance and Weight Criteria $4,125,000
Board of Inspection and Survey Deliveries $1,200,000
Maintainability (Field Demonstrated) $ 675,000
The A-7A had met all of these standards except for weight.
After weighing a selected number of A-7A and using the tables
contained in the contract, LTV was penalized $674,068.93 in
September 1968. LTV immediately protested that 150-200
22

pounds of the overweight was due to a strenghtening of the
wing area to stand more severe 'g-loading'. LTV further
stated that the Navy had encouraged this action. The Navy
did not consider these arguments sufficient and enforced the
full penalty on LTV.
E. OTHER CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS
In December 1970, a review of the business clearance
files for contract Now 64-363f indicated a final contract
price of $306,455,492 for the A-7A. This compared with a
ceiling price of $196,487,000 set at contract award. The
increase was divided across three areas; expected within the
contract, major changes, unexplained.
The majority of the price increase was expected within
the contract. When the initial A-7A contract was awarded to
LTV, only the basic aircraft themselves were fully priced.
Many items such as technical manuals, special support
equipment, spares and long lead-time funding were not covered
in the contract price. There were three reasons for this
action; time, requirements, personnel.
All the procurement actions in the A-7 program had been
aimed at getting the aircraft to the Fleet in the shortest
time. The more items the contract covered, the longer it
would have taken to price these items and sign the contract.
Many of the requirements were not even known at contract
award, particularly spare quantities for variable quantity
production lots. If the time and requirements both had been
available, there still was a shortage of skilled negotiators.
23

In the early 1960's the Navy Bureaus had. decided to rely more
on their field offices in helping to price contracts. This
was caused by a growing backlog of unpriced contracts at the
Bureaus. Consistent with this decision, BUWEPS left certain
items (spares, special support equipment, etc.) to be priced
by the BUWEPS representative at LTV as the contract progressed,
From the clearance folders, about $82.5 million was priced
by the field activity on the A-7A contract.
The major changes accounted for about $10.6 million.
Into this category fell the delivery acceleration, steam
ingestion program, fleet modifications, RAID radar, and AIMS
altitude reporting system. The final unexplained area
accounted for about $17.0 million. The majority of this area
was probably devoted to the many relatively low-priced
E.C.P.'s incorporated into the A-7A (over 100 by 1970) that
were not separately broken out for business clearances.
In view of the many factors in the A-7A program a con-
tinuing question has been, "did LTV make a profit on Contract
NOw 64-363f?" While it might have been possible to ascertain
this fact under a small company, it is completely impossible
to separate the A-7A from LTV's total business.
When LTV won the A-7A contract, it had a business backlog
of $112.8 million Government (with Lot I included) and $22,000
commercial. By the end of 1968, this same part of LTV had a
backlog of $405.6 million Government contracts and $210.0
million commercial. This rapid growth caused LTV to separate
24

the Chance-Vought assets from the parent company as LTV
Aerospace Corporation in 1965.
The separation of LTV Aerospace Corp. did not simplify
the analysis of separate contracts in either the commercial
or Government area. Besides commercial business of sub-
assembly work for the civil aviation market, LTV Aerospace
Corp. expanded into technical schools, mass-transit, food
packaging, and ski resorts. The problem on the military side
was compounded as LTV had all four A-7 versions (Navy A-7A,
A-7B, A-7E and Air Force A-7D) on contract from 1968 to 1970.
Thus even a profit aggregation under the title of A-7 would
have been useless.
Whatever the profit outcome of the A-7A contract, it
gained LTV a sole source A-7 business that is now forecast
through 1977 with Navy procurements:
A-7E
A-7A A-7B (projected: 31 March 1973)
199 196 706 to FY78
and Air Force Procurements
:
A-7D
(projected: 31 March 1973)
435 to Dec. 1973
Further, if there was a loss on the A-7A contract, it did
not seem to be reflected in the earnings per share of LTV
Aerospace Corporation as presented in the following table
from the annual editions of Moody's Industrial Manual :
25

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
$3.05 $2.12 $2.32 $1.18 $1.60 $1.57 $2.29 $4.24
26

III. HISTORY OF THE NAVY PROCUREMFNT CONTROL
AND CLEARANCE DIVISION
A. INTRODUCTION
The Navy is unique in its control concerning the business
aspect of the authority to award contracts. While the other
services have advisory groups or after-the-fact reviews for
contracting, the Navy requires submission on certain high
dollar value negotiated contracts of both a pre-negotiation
clearance and a post-negotiation clearance. The pre-
negotiation position must be approved before the Navy nego-
tiator may begin negotiating with the prospective contractor.
The post-negotiation settlement must be approved before the
Navy contracting officer may sign the contract. This procure-
ment check and balance system in the Navy is controlled by
the Director, Procurement Control and Clearance Division at
Headquarters Naval Material Command.
This section presents a history of this Navy business
clearance function as a necessary background for both the
Letter Contracts Case and the A-7E VAST case.
B. HISTORY
Two Congressional actions in 1940 brought Government
attention to contracting. First, Congress authorized use of
negotiated contracts for the construction and repair of ships
and aircraft, the first break with the Government policy of
formal advertising for all procurements. Second, Congress
27

passed the "Two-Ocean Navy" concept/ calling for a 70%
increase in Naval forces, with a resulting increase in Navy
contracts. In July 1940, to gain control in the rapidly
expanding procurement arena, President Roosevelt ordered
all contracting officers to obtain authority from the
National Defense Advisory Committee to place contracts over
$500,000. The contract volume increased so rapidly that by
December 1940 a separate agency, the Office of Production
Management, was created to handle contract approval and
related problems
.
To cope with Navy contracting problems, in October 1941
the Navy created the Materials Division (OP-24) within the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. As Robert H.
Connery in his book, The Navy and the Industrial Mobilization
in World War II , stated:
If ever the phrase 'too little, too late' can be applied
to an administrative organization, OP-24 earned that
dubious distinction. It's inability to perform its
function adequately arose from the failure of higher
authority in CNO to realize the importance of material
problems. The roots of this situation go very deep.
Officers of the regular Navy win acclaim through command
of fighting ships not through skill in logistics planning
and supervision.
With the declaration of war, Secretary of the Navy Frank
Knox took two steps to centralize Navy procurement control.
Since the creation of OP-24 by the CNO did not solve the
material problems, Mr. Knox brought Navy procurement under
the control of personnel within the Office of the Secretary
of the Navy. First, he ordered all Navy contracting officers
to submit contracts over $200,000 to his office for approval.
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His office also approved and forwarded contracts over
$500,000 to the Office of Production Management (soon to
change title to War Production Board). Second, within a
month, January 194 2, he created the Office of Procurement
and Material (OP&M) and assigned it to the Under-Secretary
of the Navy, James Forrestal. (The Material Division, OP-24
,
was disestablished within three days.) OP&M was given three
basic guidelines:
1) "... to coordinate the material activities of the
bureaus .
"
2) "... to formulate common policies of Procurement,
contracting, production, and field contract administration."
3) "... to provide a central organization within the Navy
to act for the various bureaus in dealing with different
2
external wartime agencies."
Within OP&M, the head of the Procurement Branch assumed the
contract approval authority for both the Secretary's Office
and the War Production Board. For the first time, the entire
clearance authority was controlled at one point for a
military department.
In March 1942, the business clearance function was
specifically created with the formation of the Contract
Clearance Division within the Procurement Branch of OP&M.
This function was manned by civilian business specialists
2ONM Procurement Review Group, History of ONM Contract
Clearance Branch, p. 1, 1963.
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who were charged with considering all business aspects inclu-
ding price, specifications, sources of supply, etc. to assure
the Navy got a fair price. To carry out this function, the
head of the Contract Clearance Division, who was also a
civilian business specialist, was authorized to sign for the
Secretary of the Navy and the War Production Board in
approving Navy contracts over $200,000 (Figure II-l)
.
As the war drew to an end in 1945, the contract volume
diminished drastically. In June 1945, it was decided that
the three major bureaus, Ships, Aeronautics, Ordnance, had
gained enough experience in procurement to act as their own
contract clearance authorities. The other bureaus continued
with the check and balance system between themselves and the
Contract Clearance Division.
Within two months, however, clearance authority was again
centralized in the Contract Clearance Division for all the
bureaus ". . . as it became manifest that a central clearance
authority was necessary to assure common procurement prac-
3
tices and to put teeth in the Under-Secretary's directives."
It was apparent from these actions that the Secretary of the
Navy felt that some formal check and balance system was
required for procurement. In this system the bureaus did
the actual soliciting, negotiating, and contracting while the
Contract Clearance Division provided a final independent review
and approval concerning the business aspect of the contract.
3ONM Procurement Review Group, History of ONM Contract


















































































At the end of the War the Office of Procurement and
Material was transformed to the Material Division within the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Figure II-2)
.
In March 1948, the 80th Congress passed Public Law 432 which
created the Office of Naval Material from the Material
Division, still under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
The business of the Contract Clearance Division continued
unchanged through the reorganization except after Public
Law 4 32 the title changed to Contract Clearance Branch under
the Procurement Division.
Concurrent with the hearings on Public Law 432 were the
hearings on the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947.
Passage of this Act and enactment of the Armed Services Pro-
curement Regulations added a new dimension to the business
clearance function. While the Act stated that formal adver-
tising was the preferred method of procurement and would be
used when feasible and practicable, it also recognized that
circumstances would exist when negotiation would have to be
used. Therefore, Congress created a group of exceptions
(sixteen specific and one "otherwise authorized" exception)
to be cited by the services as the reasons for not using
formal advertising.
The Determinations and Findings (D&F) was the statutory
required legal document used by the services to cite the
applicable exception and justify its use in that particular
procurement. The D&F was required "to be self-supporting
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4instrument by the General Accounting Office." Depending
on the specific exception, varying levels of approval were
required for the D&F and that approval had to be obtained
prior to solicitation of prospective contractors. Six
exceptions (small purchases, subsistence, etc.) required no
signature on the D&F. Four exceptions required the signature
of the contracting officer (medical supplies, competition
impracticable, etc.). Six exceptions required a signature
at the service Secretary level. In these instances,
exceptions #11-#16, the Navy created a Request for Authority
to Negotiate (RAN) that accompanied the D&F through the
approval chain of command to the Secretary. The RAN was
prepared by the negotiator and the contracting team. It was
forwarded through channels to Office of Naval Material
(specifically the Contract Clearance Branch) who provided
staff assistance for the Secretary. The RAN administratively
gave the Secretary supporting information for the accompanying
D&F. Through this technique the Contract Clearance Branch
exercized a quality check on procurement planning and the
solicitation document as well as business clearance approval
over the final negotiated contract.
From June 1950 through 1955, the Korean Conflict allowed
determination and Findings to be issued under Exception tone
(National Emergency) which did not require formal processing
up to the Secretary. Towards the end of 19 55, however, the
4Harbridge House Inc., Defense Procurement Management for
Technical Personnel
,
phase I, p. 44, 1972.
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Contract Clearance Branch began requiring the use of other
exceptions as practice for the Bureaus, and in January 1956/
exceptions #11-#16 were again required to be processed for
the Secretary's signature.
During the late 1950 's increased requirements were also
placed in the business clearance memorandum. These dealt
with justification of the negotiated position on labor hours,
material useage, overhead rates and profit rates among others.
These facts enabled the Contract Clearance Branch to do a
more thorough analysis of the proposed contract. The increased
requirements, however, emphasized the natural conflict between
the Bureaus and Contract Clearance Branch in the Office of
Naval Material concerning the procurement decision process.
The Bureau proceeded through the procurement until the
contract was ready to be signed. At this point the business
clearance memorandum called Request for Authority to Contract,
was submitted to the Contract Clearance Branch. From the
point of view of the Contract Clearance Branch this was a
normal part of the Procurement Administrative Lead Time
(PALT) needed to insure that the Navy obtained a good business
deal. To many in the Bureaus this was considered disruption
that delayed the procurements, allowed outsiders to second-
guess the negotiator's actions, and caused poor relations
between the contracting officer and the contractor.
The Contract Clearance Branch also noted problems with
the system but for a different reason. The required use of
negotiated contracts in high value complicated procurements
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made post-negotiation clearances difficult to process.
Occasionally, the Branch had to decide whether to approve a
contract with some imperfections or force a bureau to com-
pletely reopen negotiations.
In order to achieve earlier procurement visibility, Navy
directives were revised in 1959 to require a pre-negotiation
clearance. In this clearance the bureau would specify its
intended contract type, price, profit, labor rates, overheads,
schedule, etc., in other words a complete plan for negotiation
The Contract Clearance Branch reviewed and approved the
clearance before negotiations could begin. The post-
negotiation clearance then had only to justify settlements
that deviated from the pre-negotiation clearance thresholds.
It was felt this pre-negotiation clearance would open communi-
cations early in the procurement cycle between the bureau and
the Contract Clearance Branch, would allow negotiations only
from a well-planned and already approved position, and would
lessen delay in the post-negotiation clearance process when
the desire for all due speed to award a contract was the
strongest.
Since World War II, the contract clearance authority of
the procuring activities had fluctuated between 5200,000 and
$300,000. In October 1961, this level was raised to
$600,000 except the Bureau of Naval Weapons (a combination
of Aeronautics and Ordnance) and Bureau of Ships which were
given $1,000,000 clearance authority. In February 1962,
the clearance authority for the two major bureaus was again
raised, this time to $5,000,000, while the other activities
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remained at the $6,000,000 level. At this time, however, it
was reaffirmed that the Contract Clearance Branch had complete
authority over all letter contracts, and all cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts over $600,000.
With this new clearance level, the Contract Clearance
Branch performed formal review of about 50% of the total
dollar value of Navy contracts awarded in 1962. An additional
25% of the Navy contracts received informal reviews or after
the fact surveys from the Branch. This was accomplished
through informal contract or an information copy of the
negotiator's internal contract clearance. In 1962, the
Contract Clearance Branch processed 1,777 business clearances,
disapproved 6% of those processed, and by its own records
was directly credited with saving the Government between
$16-$20 million.
That same year also marked a complete review of the
effectiveness of the management structure within the Depart-
ment of the Navy. In the volume, Review of the Office of
Naval Material , two problems were presented that directly
or indirectly concerned the effectiveness of the Contract
Clearance Branch. The first point was directed at the Chief
of Naval Material:
It is obvious that CNM has been placed in a technical
assistant or staff assistant position . . . bureaus tend
to ignore or bypass ONM. The result, of course, is less
uniform practices, less co-ordinated action, and less
effective over-all direction and control of Navy producer-
logistics .
Since the bureaus could not bypass the Contract Clearance
Division, it became a focal point of policy enforcement. In
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a sense the chain of command channeled through the Contract
Clearance Division who used their approval authority to
direct procurement policy within the Bureaus. This was in
addition to the function of a sound business clearance
review. The second point directly illustrated one aspect of
this problem. "Too frequently, poor procurement decisions
are being made and/or procurements are being delayed because
D&F's and their related RAN's are improperly prepared. . ."
for Contract Clearance Branch processing. Instead of being
able to adequately guide procurement from its inception, the
Chief of Naval Material had to rely on the final check to
drive the entire system.
In response to these problems, 1966 brought the disestab-
lishment of the Navy bilinear chain of command (Figure II-3)
,
Since World War II the Secretary of the Navy had been the
only unified point in the chain of command. Under the
Secretary, the Chief of Naval Operations had commanded the
operating forces (user command) while the Under-Secretary
or Assistant Secretary through the Chief of Naval Material
had directed/advised the logistics forces (producer command)
In 1966, the Navy became a unilinear chain of command. The
reorganization increased the breadth of authority and respon-
sibility of the Chief of Naval Operations and strengthened
the management of the Navy's material support organization.
The Chief of Naval Operations assumed command of all Naval
forces whether user or producer. The four material Bureaus
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the Chief of Naval Material, (CNM) . The Office of Naval
Material became the Headquarters staff for the CNM. In this
capacity the Office continued to coordinate procurement
matters through the Assistant Secretary of Navy, Installations
and Logistics, however, direct control was now within the
military chain of command up to the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Chief of Naval Material was now in a position organi-
zationally to direct procurement in the Navy instead of merely
using the Procurement Control and Clearance Division (new
title for Contract Clearance Branch) to enforce policy. The
business clearance was still a necessary part of Navy procure-
ment, but it was no longer the only method to influence the
procurement practices of the Systems Commands . In his new
position the Chief of Naval Material received some powers
originally held at the Secretarial level. Among these was
the business clearance authority that had remained unchanged
since 194 2. It was still derived from the Secretary by law
but the Naval Procurement Directives now read, "Business
clearance is the required approval by the Chief of Naval
Material of the business aspects of proposed contractual
actions" (Figure II-4) . Organizationally, the Head of the
Procurement Control and Clearance Division reported to the
Deputy Chief of Naval Material, Procurement and Production
(DCNM,P&P) (Figure II-5) .
Over the next seven years the Procurement Control and
Clearance Division underwent several changes. The first
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Head of the Division no longer signed for the Secretary on
business clearances. He was using the authority of the Chief
of Naval Material as set forth in the Naval Procurement
Directives .
In January 1972, the business clearance requirements
received a thorough review. The review examined the balance
between an effective clearance review of major Navy contracts
and the most effective use of the small Headquarters staff
involved in the clearance review function. Since the business
clearance levels for the procuring activities had remained
unchanged since 1962, the impact of inflation alone was cause
for a reevaluation of the Headquarters staff workload.
As a result of this review, the clearance thresholds for
the Air, Ordnance, and Ship Systems Command were increased
from $5.0 million to $10.0 million. Several other procuring
activities were granted clearance thresholds of $2.0 million
and $3.0 million while the remainder of the Navy activities
were increased from $600,000 to $1.0 million.
In order to insure that these new thresholds were not
misinterpreted as a relaxation of business standards Navy
Procurement Circular #25 of 18 January 1972 was issued. This
circular stated:
1) "Each Navy procuring activity shall establish require-
ments for pre-negotiation business clearance and post-
negotiation business clearance."
2) "The business clearance memorandum . . . shall be
approved within the Navy procuring activity at a level higher
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than that of the individuals assigned to participate in
negotiations" (for contracts greater than $100,000).
3) "The documentation shall be retained in the files of
the Navy procuring activity."
4) "The CNM will, from time to time, conduct such reviews
of procedures and records as appropriate to assure full com-
pliance with the directive."
In March 1972, the organizational placement of D&F and
RAN processing was also reviewed. These documents were
closely tied to the concept of Advanced Procurement Planning,
the milestones relating to technical development, and the
interfaces within the user-producer chain of command for
both the Navy and the office of the Secretary of Defense.
Specifically, the D&F and RAN process was not an integral
part of the business clearance function. The need for
responsiveness prior to the start of procurement caused the
D&F and RAN processing to be moved under the direct control
of DCNM,P&P, as a staff function. This was accomplished
in March 197 2.
In January 1973, the responsibilities of the Head, Pro-
curement Control and Clearance Division, were set forth in
NAVMATINST 54 30. 3 3C as:
Provide NAVMAT, the DCNM(PSP), and procuring activities
of the Navy with centralized guidance and advice in the
area of contract clearance and control. These responsi-
bilities include:
a. Reviewing business clearances for proposed contract
awards for compliance with all applicable requirements of
law, ASPR,NPD's, and good business practice.
b. Approving or disapproving business clearances prior
to award of contracts by Navy procuring activities.
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The Procurement Control and Clearance Division (Figure
II-5) was staffed with twelve people, two secretaries and
ten contract specialists (including the Director and Deputy
Director) . The Division workload in FY73 comprised the
review of about $7.0 billion or approximately 75% of the Navy
procurement dollars for that fiscal year. To accomplish this,
the Division often had in process 25-30 major business clear-
ances (above a procuring activity's internal clearance
threshold) to be approved or disapproved and 250 information




IV. LETTER CONTRACTS CASE
A. INTRODUCTION
The period 1966 to 1970 was one of peak activity in
Southeast ASia. The resulting urgent short lead-time require-
ments severely tested the capabilities of the Department of
Defense and the defense industry. The problem was compounded
by changing policy decisions designed to manage the Southeast
Asian activity, to the maximum extent practicable, within the
existing budget constraints.
The A-7 program in the 19 6 6 to 19 7 time frame was a
striking example of these problems. Since the A-7 was prov-
ing to be an excellent attack aircraft, the Navy decided to
expand its development to more sophistacated configurations.
Further, as tactical combat improvements were discovered,
they were added, on a rush basis, to the A-7's already pro-
duced. In this same time frame, the Air Force joined the A-7
program and developed another version of the A-7 for its
mission requirements.
This Letter Contracts Case discusses the actions the Navy
took to satisfy its own and the Air Force's requirements.
The procurement actions are separated by aircraft type (Navy
A-7B, Air Force A-7D, Navy A-7E) although the events often
overlap. It should be kept in mind that during this period
meeting schedule was considered to be of paramount importance
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When schedule is emphasized, there are two contracting
methods that are most often used: letter contracts and long
lead-time funding. Letter contracting is defined by Mr. Dean
Pace in his book, Negotiation and Management of Defense
Contracts as precontract coverage, unneeded in formally
advertised procurement but an everyday fact of life on a
negotiated procurement. As he states:
Despite the risk, it is a fact of business life in the
defense industry that the vast majority of contractors
on negotiated procurements go to work and incur costs
before receipt of a fully executed contract. A letter
contract, although by no means a perfect solution, is
the best possible precontract coverage. A letter contract
is a contract. It contains a schedule and general
provisions
.
In NAVAIR inst. 4280.2 of 2 February 1971, long lead-time
funding was retitled advance procurement and defined as:
a contractual commitment to a contractor to proceed with
that effort, including planning and engineering, place-
ment of orders for material with vendors and subcontractors,
and other production effort, necessary to protect the
required delivery schedule for the contract end items
cited in the Advance Procurement contractual document.
As a general rule (this funding) shall be effected by
issuing a modification to an existing contract with the
same contractor for like items.
B. NAVY A-7B
On 28 March 1966, just after the last 17 aircraft were
purchased on the A-7A contract, an Advanced Procurement Plan
(APP #5-67) was issued that covered the continued purchase
of the A-7 series for the Navy. This APP stressed that the
new A-7 (designated A-7B) would have to be in production by
January 19 6 8 to keep the LTV production line open. A-7A pro-
duction was scheduled to complete in December 1967. To
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accomplish this, the APP projected an FY67 procurement of
230 A-7B's. Based on the A-7B capabilities and cost, future
A-7 aircraft requirements were estimated as follows:
FY58 FY69 FY70 FY71
240 156 170 170
On March 31, 1966, Determinations and Findings #0003-67
approved the procurement of 230 A-7 type aircraft. Contrac-
tually the procurement began 11 July 1966, as the Navy added
a long lead-time supplement to the basic A-7A contract.
This supplement for $3.87 million covered the procurement of
vendor materials for 230 A-7B to be delivered January 1968
to December 1968.
During August 1966, Secretary of Defense McNamara, sent
a memo to the Navy and Air Force Secretaries. The main
purpose of the memo was the discussion and approval of Air
Force entry into the A-7 program. In consideration of the
contracting problems that might result from the two services
procuring these new aircraft, the Secretary of Defense set
the following policy in the memo:
Letter contracts are authorized for initial contracting
actions which may be necessary for early delivery of
prototype aircraft, for long lead time items, and for
contractor effort required to define the production con-
figuration, specifications, schedules, and costs for the
definitive production contract.
In November 1966, the Navy separated the long lead-time
funding for the 230 A-7B's from the A-7A contract. 110 A-7B's
were placed under a letter contract limited to $38.6 million
(50% of estimated contract value). The other 120 A-7B*s were
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added as a long lead-time supplement to this letter contract
and limited to $29.9 million. Limited funds in the Navy had
caused the procurement to be divided into two parts. Funds
were available for the 110 A-7B's but the other 120 were
kept on long lead-time funding. The long lead-time items
were substantially common to all a-7's thus, if the Navy
changed its A-7B requirements, these items could be applied
to some other part of the program. In the approved business
clearance, the negotiator stated that a definitive contract
was impossible at that time due to late contractor proposals
and late audits caused by the demand for the new Air Force
A-7D program. The negotiator did, however, expect to convert
to a fixed-price type contract in 180 days.
During early 1967, LTV completed its negotiation position
for 230 A-7B's. Before negotiations could begin, the Navy
reconsidered the 120 A-7B*s on long lead-time funding and
decided to procure only 86. The long lead-time items could
still be used in another part of the program or another
fiscal year procurement, but the decision made LTV's nego-
tiation position invalid. A meeting in March 1967, between
NAVMAT and NAVAIR raised the issue of possible multi-year
procurement in the A-7 program. The discussion highlighted
problem areas with multi-year procurement but did not solve
the immediate A-7B problem. The A-7B letter contract defini-
tizatiqn date was slipped to 30 September 1967.
On 29 September 1967, an approved business clearance memo
extended the definitization date to 31 January 1968. The
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other 86 A-7B's were added to the contract for a total pro-
curement of 196 A-7B's covered by the letter contract. The
contract was limited to $135.5 million (90% of contract
value) . This new limitation had been authorized by the
Commander of NAVAIR during May 1967 in a memo that allowed
extension of the limitation on all letter contract from 50%
to 90% if necessary.
On 31 January 1968, provisional billing prices were set
for the first 76 A-7B's. This action allowed LTV to collect
payment for aircraft delivery, which had begun in January
1968, even though the letter contract was not yet definitized,
It was stated at that time that the definitization date had
been moved to 20 June 1968 by a previous agreement. Further,
the proposal that LTV was then preparing covered the 196
A-7B's delivered over an extended schedule from January 1968
to April 1969, The 76 aircraft with set billing prices would
be delivered through May 1968 and the billing prices were
only 80% of LTV's proposed price to incentivize LTV to accept
an early firm fixed-price contract.
The pre-negotiation position for converting this letter
contract to firm fixed-price at $132.7 million was condition-
ally approved on 4 April 1968. The Procurement Control and
Clearance Division stated, however, that the top of the firm
fixed-price profit range that NAVAIR recommended was not
appropriate since 60% of costs had been incurred. They
further asked that the more than 100 Engineering Change
Proposals (E.C.P.'s) on the A-7B amounting to about
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$50.0 million be included in the clearance and not separately
negotiated
.
The negotiations began, but during May 1968 the negotiator
stated that MAVAIR was considering a fixed-price-incentive
contract instead of firm fixed-price type contract. In June,
provisional billing prices were set for the next 31 aircraft
as the negotiations continued through the final delivery of
the 76 A-7B's with provisional billing prices. The billing
prices were the same as before (80% of LTV s estimated price).
This billing price document also stated that all the changes
applicable to the A-7B under the "Fleet Deployment Modifica-
tion," program would be negotiated with that program and not
with the basic A-7B contract. Also during June a complete
presentation of the A-7B contract to date was made by NAVAIR
contracting officers to the Procurement Control and Clearance
Division. After explaining the problem areas and requesting
some changes from the pre-negotiation position, the contract-
ing officers returned to negotiations with NAVMAT approval
for increasing costs in those areas verified by the latest
June audit.
On 29 July 1968, the A-7B post-negotiation clearance was
approved and the 196 A-7B's were procured for $140,415,000
with a firm fixed-price contract.
C. AIR FORCE A-7D
August 1966 marked the official approval by the Secretary
of Defense concerning Air Force entry into the A-7 program.
This approval was contained in a memo authorizing the use of
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letter contracts. In October 1966, the Navy awarded a letter
contract to LTV for long lead-time funding on 20 Air Force
A-7D's to be delivered April through December 1968. The
contract was limited to $19.0 million for the long lead-time
items and was to be definitized in April 1967 (180 days from
contract award)
.
The A-7 contracting officer in NAVAIR sent a memo in
December 1966 to the A-7 project office expressing his concern
over the use of letter contracts and emphasized the following
points
:
The letter contracting method has a serious deficiency in
that it compromises our negotiation position to a serious
extent. This factor is of considerable importance in the
light of LTV's reluctance to contract on any but a firm
fixed price basis.
The contracting officer proposed that the funding and delivery
schedules be submitted to his office for both the Navy and
Air Force programs. With this combined information, he would
prepare three separate contracting approaches for LTV quota-
tions. Depending on LTV's responses, the most advantageous
contracting approach for the Government would be chosen and
the Navy could manage both programs (Air Force and Navy) under
one contract. The approaches proposed were single year firm-
fixed-price or fixed-price-incentive with a third alternative
of a multi-year contract.
The contracting approaches never got beyond the planning
stage as both the Navy and Air Force changed their require-
ments. The Navy decreased the number of A-7B's from 230 to
196. The Air Force also decreased its A-7D procurement for
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FY67 to 12 aircraft. Actually the Navy performed both actions
after accepting Air Force inputs for the A-7D program. The
Navy A-7 project office was staffed with a few Air Force
personnel who interfaced the Air Force's requirements for A-7D
into the total A-7 program.
Advanced Procurement Plan #53-68, issued on 17 July 1967,
stated that of the 20 Air Force A-7D's originally provided
long lead-time funding, only 12 were placed under a letter
contract. The Air Force was considering a FY 68 procurement
of 100 A-7D's. The Air Force, however, was reluctant to
commit itself because the Air Force A-7D was being designed
and built basically to the Navy A-7B specifications. Since
the Navy was considering an advanced version (called the A-7E)
the Air Force wanted to keep open its options in order to
obtain the latest aircraft configuration.
Four times during the summer and fall of 1967, the Air
Force letter contract definitization date was extended and
the funding limitation was increased. During October 1967,
the funding for the original letter contract was increased
to $47.4 million and a FY68 procurement of 62 A-7D's was
added to the letter contract. The definitization date was
extended to 15 December 1967, and the Navy negotiator stated
in the business clearance memo that the extra time was neces-
sary, "to allow the Air Force and the contractor to establish





In December 1967, the Navy made the decision to proceed
with the new A-7E program instead of further procurements
of the A-7B. The Air Force expanded the delivery schedule
of its FY67 procurement (originally April to December 1968)
to April 1968 through March 1969 as follows:
April July Nov Dec Jan Feb March
2 1 112 3 2
With the first two aircraft delivered in April and the
letter contract undefinitized, provisional billing prices were
established on 27 June 1968. The negotiator proposed billing
prices set at 85% of the LTV proposal for all aircraft
delivered. The approved business clearance contained provi-
sional billing prices at 80% of LTV's proposal and covered
only the first 5 A-7D's since the letter contract was expected
to be definitized by 31 December 1968.
With the Navy now committed to the A-7E program (a March
1968 APP had converted all proposed A-7B contracts to A-7E
requirements from FY68-FY72) , the Air Force did a complete
reevaluation of its own A-7D requirements. In October 1968,
instead of adding a new FY69 procurement to the A-7D program,
the Air Force issued a memo entitled "Stretch-out of delivery
schedule and refunding of program" for the A-7D. In this
memo, the A-7D's already on contract for FY67 and FY68 had
their production schedule stretched to cover three fiscal
year's procurements. With no new A-7D's procured in FY69,




FY67- 12 A-7D's FY67- 5 A-7D's
FY68- 62 FY68- 12
FY69- 57
A post-negotiation clearance on 29 October 1968 approved
this action even though the LTV proposal was not expected
until 15 November. It was necessary to immediately get the
revised production schedule on contract since LTV had already
obligated $81.0 million on the old FY67 procurement (90% of
estimated cost) and $47.5 million on the old FY68 procurement
(50% of estimated cost) . With the fourth A-7D due in Novem-
ber 1968, LTV had to redirect its efforts to avoid wasting
money. Even with LTV changing schedules immediately/ the
Navy estimated the 74 A-7D's would cost $40.0 million more
under this new program. By extending the schedule, however,
the Air Force contended that more of their A-7D's would be
produced under the new A-7E specifications.
LTV made its proposal for the stretched-out A-7D program
on 22 November 1968, however the audit and the review from
the Naval Plant Representative Office (NAVPRO) had not yet
arrived. On 23 December 1968, NAVAIR requested an extension
of the A-7D letter contract to 31 May 1969. The extension
was approved and the negotiator stated that he planned to
convert the FY67-FY68 A-7D contracts to single-year firm-
fixed-price or fixed-price-incentive contracts.
On 20 December 1968, NAVAIR also briefed the Procurement
Control and Clearance Division on a propose fixed price
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incentive contract with successive targets. This concept
proposed to set a preliminary target price, ceiling price,
and share ratio to motivate the contractor toward cost
reduction. As such it was considered to be a viable alter-
native to a letter contract. Then, as data was available
the firm targets would be negotiated for each fiscal year
procurement. It was proposed that this approach include both
the Navy A-7E and Air Force A-7D programs from FY67-FY69.
The fixed-price incentive, successive targets approach
was approved and a pre-negotiation position was prepared
23 January 1969, that included both the Air Force and Navy
Programs, FY67-FY69.
After December 1968, all A-7D procurements were nego-
tiated with the Navy A-7E procurements. The A-7F history
which is discussed below contains the conclusion of these
joint procurements.
D. NAVY A-7E
Advanced Procurement Plan #53-68, (of 17 July 1967) was
one of the first official documents concerning the Navy's
consideration of the A-7E program. The A-7E appeared physi-
cally to be a copy of the A-7A or A-7B. Internally, however,
the A-7E design called for navigation and bombing avionics
that pushed the state-of-the-art, a rapid-fire Gattling gun
and a new turbo-fan engine rated at 30% more thrust than that
for the A-7B. Because of these technology advances, it was
proving difficult to establish firm specifications. Further,
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the A-7E was more expensive than the A-7B. APP #53-68 stated
that the FY68 A-7 procurement had not yet been decided but
the choice was between 240 A-7B*s at $202.0 million or 150
A-7E at an estimated $248.0 million.
On 7 December 1967, the Navy decided to immediately buy
the A-7E under authority of D&F #0003-67. This was possible
because only 196 A-7B's were ordered while 230 A-7 type air-
craft had been authorized by the D&F. With this authority,
long lead-time items and funds all available, the Navy chose
not to proceed through the normal budget leadtime and the
A-7E decision was written into the FY67 procurement.
The business clearance memo was approved on 28 February
1968, to issue a FY67 letter contract to LTV for 7 A-7E's.
In the memo the negotiator stated, "It is impossible to issue
a firm contract at an early date because the contracting
proposal has not yet reached the point of a pre-negotiation
position due to the late receipt of the LTV proposal." The
contract was limited to $21.5 million (50% of estimated con-
tract value) and was to be converted to a fixed-price type
contract by July 1968 (180 days from contract award)
.
With this first procurement of the A-7E, the Navy studied
its A-7 requirements based on the increased cost and perfor-
mance capabilities of the A-7E. In March 1968, APP #6-69
was issued with these new requirements but was immediately
withdrawn to be rewritten to multi-year requirements. In
April 1968, APP #6-69 was reissued unchanged as the multi-
year procurement problems were still being studied. The FY68
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procurement was set at 150 A-7E's but the price had been
reestimated to about $200.0 million. The other fiscal year
requirements were projected as follows:
FY69 FY70 FY71 FY72 .
0LD=A-7B 214 180 160 160
NEW=A-7E 214 108 68 48
A-7D 146 174 76 47
On 20 June 1968, the FY68 buy of 150 A-7E's was added to
the original A-7E contract. It was felt that as the contract
clauses and specifications were agreed upon, it would be
easier to negotiate for both procurements at one time. This
section of the letter contract was limited to $97.5 million
(50% of estimated contract value)
.
The problems of a multi-year contract with LTV were not
solved during the summer of 1968, and in October the Navy
proceeded with a separate FY69 A-7E procurement. On 22 Octo-
ber 1968, long lead-time funding for 160 A-7E's (instead of
the projected 214) was provided. The funding was limited to
$31,0 million for long lead-time items but a ceiling price
was agreed to by LTV at $260.4 million for the 160 A-7E's
(115% of the Navy estimate) . Again, reasoning that it would
be easier to negotiate one contract when the current problems
were solved, this procurement was also added to the original
A-7E letter contract.
On 19 November 1968, the A-7 contracting officer notified
the Deputy Commander of NAVAIR that since procurements of
A-7E and A-7D aircraft were less than the proposed requiremets,
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LTV had firm-fixed-price vendor options that would lapse on
31 November 1968. The contracting officer estimated a
savings of $13-$15 million if LTV was allowed to exercise
these options rather than renegotiate similar subcontracts
at the time of the next fiscal year buy. Even though it
was a year early for a normal obligation of funds on a FY70
procurement, the contracting officer recommended long lead-
time funding immediately for a FY70 buy of 78 A-7E's and 128
A-7D's.
On 21 November 1968, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Installations and Logistics, signed the D&F which approved
the procurement of "about 206 A-7 series aircraft." On
24 November 1968, the business clearance was approved for
long lead-time (LLT) funding of 78 A-7E's at $7.0 million and
$7.5 million for 128 A-7D's.
Originally these two FY70 A-7 procurements were added to
the separate Navy A-7E and Air Force A-7D letter contracts.










In December 1968, the Navy decided it would be easier to
convert the separate Navy and Air Force letter contracts into
a single fixed-price type contract. Only the firm require-
ments were worked into the pre-negotiation position. Thus
the Air Force and Navy FY70 commitments were combined under
59

another contract, long lead-time supplement N00019-70-C-0497
,
to be negotiated later.
The pre-negotiation clearance was approved 2 3 January
1969, to convert the FY67-FY69 combined letter contracts to
fixed-price-incentive, successive targets. As stated pre-
viously, this type of contract allowed the Navy to set
initial target costs, initial target profits and an initial
share ratio. When sufficient data was available prior to a
prescribed reset date, the initial targets would be converted
to firm targets. In the interim, however, the contractor
had the economic motivation of a fixed-price type contract.
This was emphasized by a contract ceiling price that was the
maximum Government liability.
The FY67-FY69 negotiation was the beginning of combined
Air Force and Navy contracts for A-7's. The FY70 A-7D/F
procurements were kept together in the long lead-time supple-
ment and each fiscal year thereafter the Navy and Air Force
A-7 requirements were covered by one contract.
The post-negotiation clearance was approved and the
combined letter contracts were converted to fixed-price-
incentive, successive targets, on 17 February 1969. From
the accepted pre-negotiation position the negotiator had
lowered the combined initial target prices a total of $10.4
million to $478.4 million for 317 A-7F's and $208.3 million
for 74 A-7D's. The negotiator stated that these low prices
from LTV appeared designed to keep the Air Force in the A-7




On 18 July 1969, the Navy reduced the FY70 A-7F's on
long lead-time funding from 78 to 27. The Navy now planned
to stretch the A-7E production into the late 1970' s as a
method of economically supplying spare aircraft without
having to restart production. The Navy requested that LTV
respond by September 1969 with a proposal for a revised FY70
requirement of 27 A-7F's and 128 A-7D's.
By December 1969, LTV had expended all of the $7.5 million
FY70 long lead-time funds for the Air Force A-7D*s. The cut-
back in Navy requirements, however, had allowed LTV to
continue funding the A-7F. LTV's proposal was expected in
early 1970 for the FY70 A-7F/D procurement. With this tenta-
tive schedule, $23.4 million was added to the A-7D long lead-
time funding. At the same time the negotiator noted that LTV
had been under a heavy workload recently supplying the pricing
information for the FY67-FY69 procurement on the fixed price
incentive, successive targets, contract. The A-7D's covered
by this contract had started delivery in April 1968, and the
A-7E's in November 1968. Thus there was a great amount of
pressure on both LTV and the Navy to compile the necessary
data to set firm targets
.
The price proposal for the FY70 procurement was submitted
by LTV 31 January 1970, but it was soon withdrawn. This was
caused by a change in FY71 A-7D requirements from 150 to 88.
The Air Force decided to stretch the FY70 procurement over
three extra months to maintain an even production flow. While
LTV prepared a new price proposal for the stretched FY70
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procurement, funds were again exhausted for the Air Force
A-7D.
On 23 April 1970, the long lead-time funding was increased
by $82.5 million to sustain LTV work on the A-7P through a
new contract definitization schedule as follows:
30 April - Audit & NAVPRO Reports
15 June - Pre-clearance to NAVMAT
29 June - Begin Negotiations
10 August - Complete Negotiations
31 August - Post clearance to NAVMAT
30 September - Contract
In May 1970, however, this proposed contract schedule
was changed. NAVAIR decided it would be advantageous to
negotiate a letter contract at that time rather than continu-
ing under the long lead-time authorization to a definitiza-
tion in September 1970. As a result, a NAVPRO report was
completed in May and the audit report arrived in early June
1970 for the negotiations on a letter contract to cover 27
A-7E's and 128 A-7D's. The contract was limited to $196.9
million Government liability through December 1970 (including
previous long lead-time funding of $120.4 million) at which
time this contract was to be definitized.
The letter contract was never awarded as the negotiations
became deadlocked over specifications. By this time the A-7F
had accumulated $10.24 million and the A-7D $10.5 million in
E.C.P.'s from the FY67-FY69 contract. In addition, there were
even newer changes estimated at SI .5-$ 2.0 million. The Navy
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and LTV did not agree on the price of these new changes nor
how many of the "older" changes should be included in the
base specification for the FY70 procurement. Before agree-
ment was reached on this contractual difference, a major
problem with the FY67-FY69 contract interrupted negotiations.
The pre-negotiation clearance for conversion to firm
targets on the FY67-FY69 contract was conditionally approved
in April 1970. The Procurement Control and Clearance Divi-
sion instructed the negotiators to cover four areas in
greater depth in the post-negotiation clearance. Of prime
interest was the subcontracting area. The post-negotiation
clearance was submitted on 29 June 1970, and disapproved due
mainly to the lack of information on subcontracts.
Due to the increased labor and material costs and higher
overhead accounts as verified by the audits, the proposed
target prices had increased from the initial targets. Fven
with LTV getting less profit than the initial prediction, the
target prices were now $224.8 million for the 74 A-7D's and
$517.5 million for the 317 A-7F's.
After the disapproval, a letter was received from LTV
dated 26 June 1970, that stated the actual material costs
used as a basis for FY67 and FY68 negotiations had been
overstated $12.8 million. The production models in these
two years had incorporated a new avionics unit in place of
an older but similar unit. In this one-for-one change, LTV
had mistakenly added the cost of the new unit but not deducted
the cost of the old unit.
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Negotiations were reopened with LTV and on 31 August
1970 r a supplemental post-negotiation clearance was submitted
that contained target prices of $222.6 million for 74 A-7D's
and $508.4 million for 317 A-7F's. The NAVAIR contracting
officers made a presentation to the Procurement Control and
Clearance Division on 15 September 1970 concerning the fixed-
price incentive, successive target contract for FY67-FY69.
The contracting officers stated that 85% of the costs had
already been incurred and the contractor was in the middle
of the profit range thus any further adjustment in cost would
not affect the final outcome. Further, the contract was
subject to a final audit at contract completion that would
disallow any inappropriate charges. On 17 September 1970,
the firm targets were approved.
On 14 October 1970, another business clearance was sub-
mitted requesting authority to issue a letter contract to
LTV for the FY70 procurement. The clearance stated the
letter contract was necessary to protect option prices on
major avionics. A fixed price contract was impossible at
this time because the Navy and LTV still had major differences
on "contract terms and conditions."
On 21 October 1970, the Head of the Procurement Control
and Clearance Division revoked the previous authority (May
1970) to issue a letter contract for FY70 A-7 procurement
and disapproved the current request. In his reply he stated
that the facts indicated a flagrant misuse of the long lead-
time funding authority in that:
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1) The long lead-time amendment had been in affect for
almost 24 months
2) The aircraft were scheduled for delivery beginning
January 1971
3) The aircraft were approximately 40.5% physically
complete
.
He advised NAVAIR "to bend every effort to negotiate a defini-
tized contract."
On the afternoon of 22 October 1970, the Head of Procure-
ment Control and Clearance Division reversed his earlier
ruling and approved the clearance for a letter contract. He
stated that he had been informed of an inquiry by a staff
member, Senate Armed Services Committee, into long lead-time
funding for FY70 A-7 procurement. Since both the staff
member and LTV had been assured by NAVAIR in writing that a
letter contract would be issued in October 1°»70, he felt
obligated to present a Navy united front. Thus he allowed
the letter contract commitments to be honored. The letter
contract was issued 30 October 1970, to be definitized by
31 December 1970. The letter contract was subsequently con-
verted to a fixed-price-incentive contract in March 1971.
With the problems of the FY67-FY69 contract solved and
the FY70 procurement definitized, there was sufficient data
available for timely future A-7 negotiations. The FY71
procurement of 88 A-7D's and 30 A-7F's had an approved pre-
negotiation clearance on 25 May 1971, for a $191.9 million
fixed-price-incentive contract. On 22 June 1971, the fixed-
price incentive contract was awarded for $192.3 million.
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V. A-7E VAST CASF
A. INTRODUCTION
The A-7F VAST CASE starts as the A-7D and A-7E letter
contract problems are compounding. This particular case is
presented to illustrate the inherent conflicts in the acqui-
sition of a complicated system. In this respect it is a
logical extension of the Letter Contracts Case as it traces
in detail the procurement history of one system. The final
conflict illustrates the fact that real world procurement
problems do not divide neatly into right and wrong.
B. A-7E VAST
In November 1968, Long-Temco-Vought began work on a
supplementary program to its A-7 series aircraft concerning
the Versatile Avionic Shop Test (VAST) equipment. The con-
cept of the program was to replace the variety and number of
special support equipment required for the A-7E with a
single large test unit that used a computer to automatically
test the faulty components. Thus a small group of highly
trained personnel, working in one area with a computer
interface, would perform maintenance on aircraft subsystems
better and faster than previously possible.
The VAST system had been developed by PRD Flectronics
under a Navy contract awarded in 1965. In 1968, the VAST
system was delivered to the first (LTV) of several Navy
aircraft manufacturers who then had the responsibility to
integrate VAST with its new aircraft. This involved either
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modifying the avionics to make them VAST testable or recom-
mending changes to the VAST equipment itself.
In early March 1969, the Contracting Officer signed the
Determinations and Findings citing exception #10 (competition
impracticable) as the reason for sole-source negotiations
with LTV for the A-7E VAST. In April 1969, a letter contract
was awarded to LTV after approval by the Procurement Control
and Clearance Division. This letter contract covered only
a Program Design Assurance Plan (PDAP) for LTV * s submission
of data and prototype equipment to prove the A-7E VAST
concept. The cost of this PDAP was estimated to be $12.0
million. The letter contract itself was specifically limited
to 50% of contract cost ($6.0 million) and was to be defini-
tized by 25 July 1969, (120 days from letter contract award).
The first formal change was not issued until 9 December
1969. In the terminology of future changes, it was listed as
MOD POOL With the letter contract still in effect, this
change extended the def initization schedule from 120 days to
235 days. The stated problem was late Government furnished
software necessary for the PDAP. Again on 5 January 1970,
by MOD P002, the def initization schedule was extended from
235 days to 283 days. The problem was still the non-
availability of Government furnished software.
The first increase in contract funding came on 21 January
1970 (389 days from the letter contract award) . The contract
definitization time had more than doubled and the initial
funding was almost exhausted. This MOD P003 increased the
allowable cost by $1.0 million to a new funding limitation
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of $7.0 million. Further, it extended the definitization
schedule from 283 days to 326 days (or 27 February 1970)
.
The problem this time was a tight budgetina constraint within
the Navy. This constraint had caused a re-evaluation of
the A-7E VAST program and culminated in the cancellation by
Naval Air Systems Command of the A-7E VAST proposal that
was to definitize the letter contract.
Under a letter contract the A-7F VAST program could
change. The nature of the program, however, encouraged even
more change. Much of the A-7F special support equipment was
already available, but the A-7E was being used as the first
aircraft to test the VAST concept. When funding was restricted
it was only necessary to shift support of some avionics equip-
ment to available special support equipment and save money
in the A-7E program. These actions rarely had impact on the
other planned A-7E VAST interfaces.
Due to the funding problem, the A-7F VAST program continued
to be undefined as to system coverage through 16 March 1970.
On this date the contracting officer issued a "Stop-Work"
order for certain parts of the program. This mainly suspended
the procurement of certain plugs and electronic receptacles
until the scope of the program work could be properly defined.
The planning studies and some assembly work continued.
On May 4, 1970, MOD P004 extended the definitization
schedule of the letter contract to 30 September 1970. Fven
with the "Stop-Work" order some planning, procurement, and
testing continued on the A-7F VAST system within the available
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funding. This change increased the allowable funding by
$1.6 million to a new limitation of $8.6 million and set out
the following definitization schedule:
31 March 1970 - defined program goals set (Done)
31 May 1970 - price proposal due from LTV
30 September 1970 - contract execution
In June 1970, the A-7E VAST program again encountered
definitization problems and the previous "Stop-Work" order
was bilaterally extended for 60 days. Once again on 5 August
1970, the same "Stop-Work" order was bilaterally extended to
1 October 1970. MOD P005 was issued on 1 September 1970,
and increased the allowable funding by $1.0 million to a new
limitation of $9.6 million.
Finally on 1 October 1970, the original "Stop-Work" order
was cancelled. The Naval Air Systems Command issued the
A-7E VAST program concept (mainly systems coverage) , but a
legal insufficiency was discovered that made it impossible
to issue a contract at the time. By 22 October, all the
legal problems had been solved and a request for authority
to contract was submitted to the Procurement Control and
Clearance Division. This prenegotiation clearance was
rejected the following day due to lack of proper supporting
information.
On 27 October 1970, a complete history of the A-7E VAST
program was presented by the Naval Air Systems Command to the
Procurement Control and Clearance Division. The focal points
of the presentation were the many required changes in program
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direction and the ensuing problems they caused to Government
and Contractor alike. Within a week of this conference,
the allowable funding of the letter contract was raised
$507,000, to a new limitation of $10,107 million. It was
then stated that the contract would be definitized by
18 December 1970. Further, the following funding schedule
was proposed through contract completion:





June $12,101 million (contract complete)
On 31 December 1970, however, the def initization schedule
was extended to 15 January 1971, at no extra cost to the
Government. The stated reason for this slippage was "due to
unexpected complexities encountered in the preparation of the
business clearance."
Finally, on 12' January 1971, the pre-negotiation position
of the Naval Air Systems Command was submitted and approved
by the Procurement Control and Clearance Division. This
position called for the conversion of the VAST letter contract








This pre-negotiation price contained an 8.91% fee. The
negotiator stated that he anticipated a difficult time hold-
ing this fee rate since "highly specialized contract engin-
eering hours are being treated as subcontracted items in the
l%-5% range, when actually they could be treated as engineer-
ing direct labor in the 9%-15% range." These above the line
calculations within the weighted guidelines could raise the
profit fee approximately 1%.
On 22 January 1971, negotiations with LTV were completed
on the conversion to a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. The
negotiation clearance was submitted to Procurement Control
and Clearance Division and the definitization schedule was
officially extended to 29 January to allow review. The
post-negotiation clearance had accomplished a price reduction
of $110,836 from, the approved pre-negotiation position,
however, the cost and fee ratio had shifted.
Post-Negotiation Cost $10,380,000 down $148,818 from pre-
negotiation
. Fee 986,100 up 47,982
Price $11,366,100 down $100,836
This constituted a fee of 9.5% on estimated costs. The
assigned evaluator within Procurement Control and Clearance
Division cited, the negotiator's position on engineering hours
for the fee increase and on 26 January 1971, forwarded the
post negotiation clearance recommending approval.
Within the next two days the following actions occurred.
The Head of the Procurement Control and Clearance Division
71

felt only a fee of 8.91% was merited on this CPFF contract.
He recommended disapproval of the 9.5% fee from the business
consideration stating that contract performance was 90-95%
complete. He further stated that he did not want that kind
of fee precedent set at LTV, but the fee "would be OK in
any other type of contract." His superior, the Deputy Chief
of Naval Material (Procurement and Production) signed the
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